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“A KIND OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE”:
REEXAMINING THE AUDIENCE’S ROLE IN
EXEMPTING ACADEMIC FREEDOM FROM
GARCETTI’S EMPLOYEE SPEECH
DOCTRINE
Michael A. Sloman*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos
put further restraints on public employee speech by exempting
from First Amendment protection speech made pursuant to the
“official duties” of public employees. This limitation, if applied
to the speech of college professors, would constrain their
academic freedom of instruction and scholarship by permitting
overbearing institutional oversight. This constraint would be
detrimental not only to the employed professors, but also to
their students and the post-secondary educational system as a
whole. Courts should not apply Garcetti to academic freedom
in the post-secondary education context, and they should avoid
further limitations on professorial speech.
This Note argues that Garcetti should not be applied to
higher education faculty by reconsidering the purpose of the
university and the role that students and colleagues play in the
expressive activities of professors. While many commentators
have noted Garcetti’s potential detriment to the speaker, very
few have considered the audience’s participation in both
instruction and research. This Note accounts for the rights of
those receiving instruction from, or engaging in scholarship
with, the professor to argue that restraints on professorial
speech harm both the speaker and the audience.

* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Georgia School of Law; A.B., 2018, University of
Georgia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.”1 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s sweeping assertion in Tinker v. Des Moines
perfectly demonstrates how far the American judicial system is
willing to go to preserve the classroom’s peculiar role as “the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”2 These “constitutional freedoms” primarily
refer to the First Amendment’s protections for free expression.3
Importantly, these protections are not merely rights afforded to
American students; rather, teachers also enjoy (to some extent) free
speech rights.4 At the collegiate level, freedom of expression
naturally implicates a professor’s in-class instruction or
professional scholarship.5 A professor’s freedom to teach, research,
and publish without infringement is generally known as “academic
freedom.”6 But does the First Amendment fully embrace academic
freedom as a form of protected individual expression?
In Bishop v. Aronov, the Eleventh Circuit expressed doubt “that
academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.”7
Despite ardent protections for free speech, both teachers and
scholars recognize the tenuous legal status of academic freedom as
protected speech.8 Without freedom to publish or instruct as they
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
2 Id. (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
3 Id. at 505–06 (analyzing students’ rights to freely engage in protest as a First Amendment
right of expression); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .”).
4 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
(emphasis added)).
5 While some of the concerns outlined in this Note implicate other public educators, this
Note’s analysis focuses on university professors who produce scholarship and perform
postsecondary instruction.
6 Stacy E. Smith, Who Owns Academic Freedom?: The Standard for Academic Free Speech
at Public Universities, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 307 (2002).
7 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991).
8 See Kim Fries, Vincent J. Connelly & Todd A. DeMitchell, Academic Freedom in the Public
K-12 Classroom: Professional Responsibility or Constitutional Right? A Conversation with
Teachers, 227 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 505, 522 (2008) (“Teachers . . . perceive that their
academic freedom is rooted in their professional work with students and not necessarily

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 10

938

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:935

please, professors may be subject to discipline from their employing
institutions, and the marketplace of ideas may be sullied. The
immediate fear of government censorship is obvious—our society
has long recognized that a college “may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed by any
group to be abhorrent.”9 This legitimate fear of censorship was
heightened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos.10 There, the Court further narrowed the availability of
free speech to public employees by holding that all speech made
pursuant to the “official duties” of a public employee’s job does not
receive First Amendment protection.11 This restriction on free
expression naturally applies to instructors and researchers at
public universities whose official duties likely include forms of
speech.12 Given that the classroom requires the most “vigilant
protection” of our constitutional freedoms,13 Garcetti’s potential
limitation on collegiate instruction and scholarship, by placing
these activities outside the scope of the First Amendment, presents
a very real danger to American society as a whole.
This Note argues that Garcetti cannot be applied to the academic
speech of professors pursuant to their teaching or scholarship,
because controlling this speech contravenes the purposes of the
First Amendment and infringes on the rights of the audience. Only
one other scholar, Aaron Worthen, has addressed the role the

grounded in constitutional law. To them, academic freedom is not a robust right that can be
used to define practice.”); see also John Inazu, The Purpose (and Limits) of the University,
2018 UTAH L. REV. 943, 960 (2018) (“[T]he realities of academic freedom are not as clear as
these ideals.”).
9 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972).
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
11 Id. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
12 See Hilary Habib, Note, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Garcetti Era,
22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 514 (2013) (“[Garcetti] creates a substantial problem for
professors at public universities because their publications, research, scholarship, and
criticisms of the university likely fall within their official duties and are, thus, left
unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
13 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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audience plays in a Garcetti-based analysis of professorial speech.14
Worthen, however, concludes that only professorial speech related
to scholarship should be exempt from the Garcetti doctrine, arguing
that in-class instruction should still be subject to Garcetti’s
stringent standards.15 This Note takes a similar approach as
Worthen, examining the legal background of academic freedom, the
effects of Garcetti and post-Garcetti decisions on academic freedom,
and finally arguing for the abandonment of Garcetti in the narrow
context of professorial speech. Unlike Worthen, however, this Note
concludes that both instruction and scholarship should receive
higher levels of constitutional protection under the First
Amendment.
Part II of this Note explores the history of academic freedom in
the United States and the development of the public employee
speech doctrine, focusing specifically on Garcetti. Part III examines
how the circuit courts have treated cases where parties have
asserted academic freedom after Garcetti and how scholars have
reacted to this developing doctrine. Part IV summarizes the
audience’s right to receive communication and its heightened
importance in education and concludes that additional First
Amendment protection precludes the application of Garcetti to
collegiate academic freedom cases.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Professorial speech jurisprudence draws upon two competing
First Amendment doctrines: academic freedom’s permissive free
speech principles and the free speech limitations imposed on
government employees.16 Although these two doctrines rarely
overlap, “the nature of the university setting is, in many respects,
unique among other places of public employment” and requires

14 See generally Aaron Worthen, Comment, Think of the Children: How the Role of Students
in the Classroom Informs Future Applications of Garcetti v. Ceballos in Academic Contexts,
2014 BYU L. REV. 983 (2014).
15 Id. at 1014 (“[I]t becomes evident that the Garcetti rule should govern professional speech
related to teaching but not professional speech related to scholarship.”).
16 See Smith, supra note 6, at 325 (noting the tension between the “severely restrictive
standards” applied to public employee speech and the more lenient protections afforded to
academic freedom).
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courts to differentiate between academic speech and employee
speech.17 University professors must confront both these protections
and limitations when assessing their rights. This Part details the
evolution of both doctrines and analyzes the challenges to their
reconciliation presented by Garcetti, which further limited the free
speech rights of public employees.18
A. ACADEMIC FREEDOM

In 1940, the American Association of University Professors (the
AAUP) promulgated a Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure (the 1940 Statement).19 The stated purpose of
the document was “to promote public understanding and support of
academic freedom” and to lay out three guiding principles for
academic freedom: (1) professors are entitled to “full freedom” in
their research and publications; (2) professors have freedom to
discuss what they want in class, as long as the content is reasonably
related to their subject matter; and (3) professors who “speak[] or
write[] as . . . citizen[s]” should be free from censorship or discipline
by their employing institution.20 The 1940 Statement formalized the
concept of academic freedom and the AAUP’s formulation continues
to guide the standards for many academic codes.21

Habib, supra note 12, at 530.
Id. at 511 (“Garcetti’s holding has considerably decreased the number of public
employment cases finding in favor of First Amendment protection.”).
19 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of
Principles and Interpretive Comments, 56 AAUP BULL. 323 (1970). The 1940 Statement built
on a previous 1915 Declaration by the AAUP, which first introduced the “[m]odern American
understandings of academic freedom.” Inazu, supra note 8, at 959. For a thorough review of
the 1915 Declaration, see Smith, supra note 6, at 310–11.
20 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 19, at 324.
21 See McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 914 N.W.2d 708, 746 n.10 (Wis. 2018) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (“As the first organization to develop codes of academic freedom, AAUP’s
statements remain the model.”). More than 250 academic groups and organizations have
endorsed the 1940 Statement, and hundreds of American colleges and universities have
adopted it in some form in their academic policies. Smith, supra note 6, at 312; see also
Endorsers of the 1940 Statement, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, https://www.aaup.org/endorsers1940-statement (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) (listing endorsers in alphabetical order).
17
18
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The U.S. Supreme Court first began acknowledging academic
freedom as a unique interest of education in the early 1950s.22
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Adler v. Board of Education23 and
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff24
invoked the concept of academic freedom to caution against state
actions aimed at employees during the Communist scares, arguing
that teachers cannot effectively educate in an atmosphere that
distrusts discussion of sensitive, and possibly subversive, topics.25
Though the legal conception of academic freedom would grow to
encompass more parties and greater rights, the foundation of the
Court’s jurisprudence “began primarily with an emphasis on the
rights of individual teachers.”26
Sweezy v. New Hampshire marked the first great triumph for
academic freedom in the courts.27 There, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a University of New Hampshire professor
for a lecture he had given to his students during which he allegedly
violated the state’s subversive conduct act.28 In the plurality
opinion, Chief Justice Warren extolled the “essentiality of freedom
in the community of American universities,” declaring that
22 See Smith, supra note 6, at 313 (noting that “[t]he courts first paid attention to the
concept of academic freedom as a response to government investigations of alleged communist
conspiracies” during the 1950s and 1960s”).
23 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution guarantees freedom
of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none needs it
more than the teacher.”).
24 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To regard teachers . . . as the
priests of our democracy is . . . not to indulge in hyperbole. . . . They must have the freedom
of responsible inquiry . . . .”).
25 See Smith, supra note 6, at 317 (“[T]he concept of academic freedom, although not the
actual term, initially emerged into Supreme Court jurisprudence through dissenting and
concurring opinions.”). But the two cases themselves did not directly involve academic
freedom. In Adler, public school teachers claimed that a New York law permitting dismissal
of “subversive” public employees violated their First Amendment rights. 342 U.S. at 489–92.
The Court found “no constitutional infirmity” with the law in Adler, see id. at 496, but it later
held the law unconstitutional in a subsequent case. See infra note 30. In Wieman, state
employees alleged that the state government could not require them to take an oath of loyalty,
and Justice Frankfurter examined the effect such a law would have on educators. 344 U.S. at
196–97. The Court struck down the law in Wieman because “[t]he oath offend[ed] due
process.” Id. at 191.
26 Smith, supra note 6, at 317.
27 354 U.S. 234, 235–55 (1957) (plurality opinion).
28 Id. at 243–45, 255.
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“[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, [and] to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise[,] our civilization will stagnate and die.”29
The Court reaffirmed these principles ten years later in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, finally applying a form of
constitutional protection to academic freedom.30 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, declared that America “is deeply committed
to safeguarding academic freedom, [and] . . . [t]hat freedom is . . . a
special concern of the First Amendment.”31 Describing the
classroom as a “marketplace of ideas,” Justice Brennan stated that
academic freedom is “of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned.”32 By noting that teachers are not
the only class in society with an interest in protecting academic
freedom, Keyishian necessarily implies that students may also be
protected by a constitutional right to academic freedom.33
But the Court has rarely enforced academic freedom as an
individual-centric right; rather, “[e]ven judicial rhetoric more
friendly to academic freedom has . . . focused on the institution of
the university rather than the individual faculty member.”34 In his
Sweezy concurrence, Justice Frankfurter provides an example of
this institutional primacy by identifying “‘the four essential

Id. at 250.
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian held unconstitutional the New York law previously
upheld in Adler as applied to the plaintiffs in this case. Id. at 609–10; see also supra note 25.
31 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
32 Id.
33 Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (recognizing “learning-freedom”
as a “corollary” to “academic teaching-freedom”); Rory Thomas Gray, Note, Academic
Freedom on the Rack: Stretching Academic Freedom Beyond its Constitutional Limits in FAIR
v. Rumsfeld, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1131, 1149 (2006) (noting that the Court did not
“elaborate upon the full extent of students’ academic freedom” until the 1970s). Gray appears
to rely on the 1970s as a turning point due to the Court’s 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Id. Although Tinker did not
directly concern academic freedom, it is a foundational case, ensuring that students retain
constitutional protections while in school, and it is a necessary component of First
Amendment protections for students. See Inazu, supra note 8, at 955 n.55 (discussing how
the Court primarily invokes Tinker in the university setting to support the First
Amendment’s applicability to public universities).
34 Inazu, supra note 8, at 961; see also Gray, supra note 33, at 1152 (“Academic freedom, in
its institutional guise, . . . grant[s] educational experts the corporate ability to govern the
aspects of university life most intimately related to the educational process.”).
29
30

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss2/10

8

Sloman: “A Kind of Continuing Dialogue”: Reexamining the Audience’s Role

2021]

A KIND OF CONTINUING DIALOGUE

943

freedoms’ of a university.”35 These “four essential freedoms” are the
freedoms for an institution “to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.”36 These freedoms have since
expanded “to include a generalized principle of deference to a
university’s academic decisions.”37
Paradoxically, a university’s right to make unilateral decisions
regarding academic policy can conflict with—and potentially
override—a professor’s right to teach as they deem most effective.38
For example, the Third Circuit, in a decision by then-Judge Alito,
has held that “a public university professor does not have a First
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom”
because the teacher cannot contravene the school’s policy or
curriculum.39 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit used academic
freedom’s tenuous legal footing—at least to the extent that it may
35 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE
OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (Elbert van de Sandt Centlivres et al. eds.,
Whitwatersrand Univ. Press 1957)).
36 Id.
37 Gray, supra note 33, at 1152. Gray also notes that the Court has gone to great lengths in
cases where it rules against the universities to reaffirm its “respect for [the schools’]
legitimate academic decisionmaking.” Id. at 1153 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 199 (1990)).
38 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (“Academic
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself.” (citations omitted)); see also Worthen, supra note 14,
at 987–88 (noting the tension between these two “competing concepts” of academic freedom).
But see Smith, supra note 6, at 323–24 (“More accurately, the Supreme Court’s recognition of
institutional academic freedom acts as a complementary layer of protection for academic
speech.”); Gray, supra note 33, at 1153–54 (“While this deference to academic judgment is
substantial, it is not absolute. . . . The Supreme Court has resisted school officials’ efforts to
extend such deference to decisions that unnecessarily inhibit students’ First Amendment
freedoms.”).
39 Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998). After a student complained
that Edwards was using class materials to advance a certain religious view, the university
restricted the materials that Edwards, a tenured professor, could use in the class he taught
and suspended him for an academic term. Id. at 489–90. Though the court held that Edwards
could campaign for the use of the controversial material’s inclusion in the class’s syllabus
outside of the classroom, it also held that Edwards had no right to use his teaching methods
inside the classroom. Id. at 491 (“[A]lthough Edwards has a right to advocate outside of the
classroom for the use of certain curriculum materials, he does not have a right to use those
materials in the classroom.”).
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be recognized as an inherent constitutional right and not merely
adjacent to First Amendment protections—to conclude that a
university’s interest in controlling its doctrinal mission outweighed
any possible infringement on a professor’s constitutional rights.40
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Garcetti only further
highlighted the fragility of professors’ academic freedom as opposed
to their employing institutions’ rights.41
B. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE

Beyond the academic context, every public employee faces
substantial hurdles in asserting First Amendment rights in their
professional workplace.42 Although courts initially permitted public
employers to restrict their employees’ speech without cause,43 the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of
Education established the current balancing test for determining
when a public employer may constitutionally limit an employee’s
speech.44 Under Pickering, courts must weigh the employee’s First
Amendment interests in “commenting upon matters of public
concern” against the government’s interests in acting as an
employer and in providing public services.45 Only if the
government’s interests outweigh the employee’s is it permitted to
control the form of expression.

40 See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Though we are mindful of
the invaluable role academic freedom plays in our public schools . . . we do not find support
to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.”).
41 See Worthen, supra note 14, at 988 (“This tension has come to the forefront of First
Amendment jurisprudence in the wake of Garcetti.”); see also infra Part III.
42 See Smith, supra note 6, at 325 (“Public employees traditionally had no free speech
rights. . . . The Supreme Court retreated from this broad position in 1968, but in subsequent
cases, it has narrowly delimited government employees’ free speech rights.”).
43 See Habib, supra note 12, at 514 (“Prior to the 1960s, as a constitutional matter, the
speech of a public employee could be restricted without cause by the employer.”).
44 391 U.S. 563, 568–73 (1968) (applying the balancing test to find that a school board
violated a teacher’s First Amendment rights when it fired him for writing a letter to the local
newspaper criticizing the board’s revenue-raising tax proposal).
45 Id. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.”).
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Although Pickering requires lower courts to perform this
balancing test, it fails to explain how to weigh these interests, what
factors are determinative in this analysis, and what qualifies as a
matter of public concern.46 The Court provided further guidance on
what is, and is not, a matter of public concern in Connick v. Myers,
stating that a matter of public concern can “be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”47 The Court explained that “the content, form, and
context of a given statement” are determinative in evaluating the
speech at issue.48 Courts are much more likely to find for the
speaker when the speech “operates at the core of the First
Amendment,”49 but there is a noted bias in some circuits to side with
the government in most cases.50
C. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS

In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos and
created an additional hurdle for public employees pressing their free
speech rights.51 In this case, Ceballos, a district attorney in Los
Angeles, wrote a memorandum denouncing the use of an affidavit
which contained “serious misrepresentations” in order to secure an

46 See Habib, supra note 12, at 516 (explaining that lower courts had to develop their own
standards to perform the Pickering analysis, leading to inconsistency and “considerable
confusion”).
47 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). The Court also indicated that an employer must demonstrate
actual or potential disruption on account of the employee to prevail in the balancing test. Id.
at 152–54. But see Smith, supra note 6, at 330 n.177 (arguing that the Court’s decision in
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), heightened the requirement of “potential
disruption” to “actual disruption”).
48 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. This analysis seems to consider factors such as venue,
articulation, audience, tone, and any other element of the disseminated speech.
49 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (discussing the core First Amendment right to
display signs critical of foreign embassies).
50 See, e.g., Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 576 (11th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging the
circuit’s preference for deciding in favor of the state employer); see also Lewis M. Wasserman
& John P. Connolly, Unipolar Panel Effects and Ideological Commitment: An Analysis of U.S.
Courts of Appeals Free Speech Decisions Involving K–12 Public Education Employees, 31
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 537, 541 (2016) (finding that the U.S. Courts of Appeals found in
favor of employers in K–12 free speech cases progressively more often throughout the years,
up to approximately eighty percent of the time in the period from 2006–2014).
51 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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arrest warrant.52 After tension arose between him and his
supervisors, Ceballos alleged that he was reassigned to a different
position, transferred to another courthouse, and denied a
promotion.53 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Ceballos, finding that
the district had retaliated against his constitutionally protected
speech.54
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected Ceballos’s claim and
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.55 Finding that Ceballos
clearly wrote his memorandum pursuant to his official employment
responsibilities, the Court held “that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”56 Because Ceballos’s speech was unprotected by the
First Amendment, the Court refrained from applying the Pickering
analysis, even though Ceballos’s speech involved a matter of public
concern.57 The Court reasoned that speech created by employees
within the scope of their official duties “owes its existence” to the
government’s employment, and the government has longstanding
authority to regulate speech that it “itself has commissioned or
created.”58 Therefore, any speech found to fall within the scope of
Garcetti cannot even reach the balancing analysis under Pickering,
precluding that speech from ever succeeding on a First Amendment
claim.
Garcetti’s holding, though “not directly involv[ing] academic
speech,” has reignited a debate about “how much First Amendment

52 Id. at 413–14. Ceballos also testified at a hearing for the defense that the affidavit
contained errors. Id. at 414–15.
53 Id. at 415.
54 Id. at 415–16.
55 Id. at 417.
56 Id. at 421.
57 See Habib, supra note 12, at 520 (explaining how Garcetti’s ruling is “consistent” with
the Pickering doctrine because it merely added a “threshold inquiry”).
58 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (“[T]he
First Amendment does not say that Congress and other government entities must abridge
their own ability to speak freely. And our cases recognize that ‘[t]he Free Speech
Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009))).
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protection academic speech deserves.”59 Justice Souter, in a
dissenting opinion, urged that Garcetti would “imperil First
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and
universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant
to . . . official duties.’”60 The majority acknowledged Souter’s
concern and stated that the Court “need not . . . decide whether the
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”61 Rather than
solving the issue, this language has created a circuit split in the
realm of academic freedom.

III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER GARCETTI
A. CIRCUIT COURT CASES

Because Garcetti did not address the issue, circuit courts have
diverged in applying the public employee speech doctrine to
educators who claim that their public institutions have infringed
upon their academic freedom.62 Some circuits have held that postsecondary scholarship and classroom instruction are outside the
scope of Garcetti’s “official duties” test and therefore warrant First
Amendment protection.63 In Demers, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that applying Garcetti to instruction and scholarship “would
directly conflict with the important First Amendment values
previously articulated by the Supreme Court.”64 The Fourth Circuit
was more timid, choosing only to apply the Pickering test instead of

Worthen, supra note 14, at 988.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited Keyishian and
Sweezy to argue that academic freedom must be exempt from the Garcetti holding. Id. at 439.
61 Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
62 See Worthen, supra note 14, at 988–91 (noting that “in the eight years since Garcetti, the
circuit courts have split regarding whether the new public employee rule should extend to
speech related to scholarship or teaching”).
63 See, e.g., Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We hold that Garcetti does
not apply to ‘speech related to scholarship or teaching.’” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425));
Adams v. Trs, of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We
are . . . persuaded that Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public
university.”).
64 Demers, 746 F.3d at 411.
59
60
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Garcetti because the Court had explicitly opted to leave the question
of Garcetti’s applicability to academic speech unresolved.65
On the other hand, other circuits have seemingly followed the
pre-Garcetti doctrine, which defers to an institution’s academic
freedom over the individual professor’s.66 The Sixth Circuit has
relied on pre-Garcetti precedent to affirmatively state that
educators do not have a right to contravene a school’s “curricular
and pedagogical choices.”67 The Seventh Circuit has also indicated
that Garcetti may control in-class instruction,68 although it has not
yet addressed the issue in the post-secondary context.69 Finally,
some circuits have declined to reach the issue, but nevertheless
have acknowledged the doctrinal uncertainty.70

65 Adams, 640 F.3d at 563 (“The Court explicitly did not decide whether this analysis would
apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to teaching. Thus, we continue
to apply the Pickering–Connick standard . . . .” (quoting Lee v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d
687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007)). In Adams, a university allegedly denied a promotion to Adams
based on his scholarly and instructive speech published in newspaper columns, radio shows,
and a book outside the scope of his university employment. Id. at 552–54. The court
acknowledged that the university hired Adams to be a scholar and educator, and Garcetti
might implicate such teaching and research that occurs due to the terms of his employment.
Id. at 563–64. Here, however, the speech was clearly not sponsored by the university and
therefore did not implicate Garcetti “under the facts of this case.” Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
The court’s reference to the specific “circumstances of this case” indicate Adams’s holding
may only apply to that particular set of facts. Id.
66 See supra Part II.A.
67 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In the context of inclass curricular speech, this court has already said in the university arena that a teacher’s
invocation of academic freedom does not warrant judicial intrusion upon an educational
institution’s decisions.” (citing Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989))). Although
Evans-Marshall deals with a high school teacher’s academic freedom and the court explicitly
recognized greater latitude for instructors in the collegiate context, the court still narrowed
the constitutional rights of “nontenured” professors. Id.
68 See Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding
that primary and secondary school teachers do not have a right to deviate from their school’s
adopted curriculum).
69 See Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2016) (declining to extend
Demers into the primary and secondary education contexts by recognizing the uniqueness of
post-secondary scholarship).
70 See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the issues
concerning scholarship and instruction that Justice Souter raised in his Garcetti dissent but
failing to reach the issue because the professor’s statements “clearly were not ‘speech related
to scholarship or teaching’” (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)));
Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 18 (D.C.
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B. POST-GARCETTI SCHOLARSHIP

The legal community immediately recognized the implications of
Garcetti’s holding as it relates to academic freedom. Aaron Worthen
identifies three categories into which legal scholars approaching the
applicability of Garcetti to academic freedom fall: “those who
conclude that Garcetti should apply to both scholarship and
teaching, those who maintain that Garcetti should not apply to
either scholarship or teaching, and those who contend that Garcetti
should apply in some situations but not in others.”71 The first
category encompasses those who support extending Garcetti to
cases involving academic freedom, and its proponents generally
argue that academic freedom only ever applied to institutions, not
to individuals.72
Other commentators, however, argue that “[a]cademic speech
must be distinguished from public-employee speech” and support at
least some exception to Garcetti.73 Compared to other government
employees who “may be paid to disseminate a government message
or provide a service,” professors provide a service which requires the
participation of others—the students.74 However, there is near
universal recognition that only those who work in the university
setting enjoy this distinction.75 The U.S. Supreme Court has “long

Cir. 2008) (Edwards, J., concurring) (noting that the court should not decide whether
academic freedom falls within the ambit of Garcetti because the Court declined to decide the
same issue); Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining to answer
whether Garcetti applies to classroom instruction because the appellant teacher failed to raise
the issue on appeal); cf. Lee-Walker v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 712 F. App’x 43, 45 (2d Cir.
2017) (basing a school board’s qualified immunity on Panse’s failure to create “clearly
established law” regarding educators’ free speech rights in classroom instruction).
71 Worthen, supra note 14, at 991–92.
72 Id. at 992 (citing Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 645–49, 656 (2012)).
73 Habib, supra note 12, at 530.
74 Id. at 531.
75 See, e.g., id. (highlighting “internal critique” as an essential differentiating factor
between universities and other places of public employment); Carol N. Tran, Comment,
Recognizing an Academic Freedom Exception to the Garcetti Limitation on the First
Amendment Right to Free Speech, 45 AKRON L. REV. 945, 980 (2012) (“[U]niversities are
different and unique forms of institutions.”). Most commentators who fall into Worthen’s
third category, those advocating for some hybrid application of Garcetti, typically argue that
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recognized that, given the important purpose of public education
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in
our constitutional tradition.”76 These scholars, who maintain that
the university academic freedom context is unique, argue that an
exception to Garcetti should be carved out in this specific instance.77
Limiting the free speech rights of professors producing scholarship
runs “contrary to the academic freedom’s objective of critical
inquiry.”78 Indeed, freedom from institutional oversight ensures
academic integrity.79
Notably, Worthen is the main post-Garcetti commentator who
has examined the importance of students in defining professors’
academic freedom rights.80 He ultimately argues that Garcetti
should apply to a professor’s speech related to teaching, but that
Garcetti should not encompass speech made in relation to
scholarship.81 Worthen’s reasoning that students are a captive
audience and that a classroom is not a true marketplace of ideas
lead him to conclude that the oversight offered to the government
by Garcetti is warranted in university instruction.82 Because these
same concerns do not arise under scholarship, Worthen argues that
university professors deserve greater leniency in instruction than primary and secondary
school teachers. Worthen, supra note 14, at 993.
76 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
77 See, e.g., Habib, supra note 12, at 542–43 (arguing that academic speech should only be
analyzed under Pickering and not Garcetti); Tran, supra note 75, at 979 (suggesting that a
“more thoughtful analysis” predicated on the 1940 Statement should be used to analyze
scholarship and instruction).
78 Tran, supra note 75, at 979. The criticism that Garcetti contravenes the mission of a
university by inhibiting academic speech is a legitimate concern. See Habib, supra note 12,
at 541–42 (denouncing governmental control of professors’ academic activity through unfair
school policies as “a type of fraud on the public”). This Note considers this proposition in a
similar vein: how failure to account for the rights of an audience runs afoul of a university’s
academic mission. See infra Part IV.B.
79 See Smith, supra note 6, at 354 (“Professors deserve more freedom from employer control
than typical employees because scholarly independence is a prerequisite for the proper
performance of academic work.”).
80 See Worthen, supra note 14, at 993–94. Rory Thomas Gray also addresses the role of
students, but in a note that predates Garcetti. See Gray, supra note 33.
81 Worthen, supra note 14, at 1014 (“[W]hen . . . attention is paid to the role students play
in the classroom, it becomes evident that the Garcetti rule should govern professional speech
related to teaching but not professional speech related to scholarship.”).
82 Id. at 1005.
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“many of the academic freedom principles articulated by the
Supreme Court can be preserved by solely protecting professors’
scholarship.”83

IV. THE ROLE OF AN AUDIENCE
The primary flaw in most analyses of Garcetti’s intersection with
academic freedom is the hyper-focus on the speaker and the
speaker’s rights. Naturally, affirmative speech draws greater
attention than silence.84 But professors do not speak merely to
express their own ideas or even to communicate specific messages
dictated by the government; rather, professors engage in a dialogue
with their students—or in the case of scholarship, with their peers—
which stands apart in traditional First Amendment doctrine.85 By
applying Garcetti to these forms of expression, the courts have
functionally ignored the listeners. Moving away from an analysis of
academic speech as government speech will provide greater rights
and protections to the audience of university professors, not just the
professors themselves.
A. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE COMMUNICATIONS

The U.S. Supreme Court has long upheld an individual’s right to
“receive information and ideas.”86 It is unclear exactly which
provisions of the First Amendment provide these protections, as the
Court has offered various clauses as the basis for this constitutional
right.87 Nevertheless, both the speaker and the listener are
Id. at 1008.
See Matthew Baker, Comment, A Teacher’s Right to Remain Silent: Reasonable
Accommodation of Negative Speech Rights in the Classroom, 2009 BYU L. REV. 705, 705
(2009) (“Nearly every significant case analyzing public school teacher speech rights in the
classroom involves affirmative expression.”).
85 See Smith, supra note 6, at 353 (“Scholarly speech is neither ordinary employee
workplace speech nor common public debate.”).
86 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
87 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citing the
speech and press clauses); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–87 (1960) (citing the
association clause); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (citing the speech and
assembly clauses). While it is normally immaterial which First Amendment provision
provides a substantive right, it is possible that the right’s origin affects the Garcetti analysis.
83
84
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independently afforded protection under this doctrine.88 The right
to receive information supports the First Amendment’s goal of
“preserving an uninhibited marketplace of ideas” where the public
may obtain “suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences.”89 For this reason, the U.S.
Constitution protects communications that “enhance the
functioning of our republican form of government.”90 To effectuate
the promotion of this marketplace, “[t]he ‘rights’ of the speaker are
thus always tempered by a consideration of the rights of the
audience and the public purpose served, or disserved, by his
speech.”91
The right to receive information is of particular concern in the
academic setting: “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”92 Education is defined by the interaction between the
instructor and the instructed—“a kind of continuing dialogue.”93
This dialogue is essential to the improvement and development of
our society:
Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials in
their search for truth. If we are to become an integrated,
adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo

Because Garcetti only concerns itself with speech, the right to receive information as founded
in association or assembly might prevent Garcetti from affecting expression protected by this
right.
88 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows ineluctably
from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them . . . . More importantly, the right to
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights
of speech, press, and political freedom.”).
89 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
90 Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584 (5th Cir. 1986).
91 Id.
92 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (“This Court has recognized that [the right to receive information]
is ‘nowhere more vital’ than in our schools and universities.” (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
93 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Tax-Exempt Foundations: Hearings on H. Res. 561 Before the H. Select Comm. to Investigate
Tax-Exempt Founds. & Comparable Orgs., 82d Cong. 291 (1952) (statement of Robert M.
Hutchins, Associate Director of the Ford Foundation)); see also Inazu, supra note 8, at 947–
49 (identifying a dialogue that fosters “constrained disagreement” as a necessary
characteristic of a university).
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opposed to change, students and faculties should have
communal interests in which each age learns from the
other. Without ferment of one kind or another, a college
or university (like a federal agency or other human
institution) becomes a useless appendage to a society
which traditionally has reflected the spirit of
rebellion.94
The school’s role in developing citizens is seen as a crucial facet of
the educational system—one that requires special attention when it
comes to First Amendment protections.95 Depriving students of the
opportunity to hear contrasting opinions on important issues can
infringe on these students’ rights to participate in society and to
realize their political freedom.96
The Court has even distinguished between the academic
freedoms of teaching and learning, implying that learning has a
unique status as a First Amendment right.97 Sweezy’s declaration
that “students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding” stands just as
true today as it did over sixty years ago.98 The same principles are
necessarily true in the realm of academic scholarship as well.99
B. REAFFIRMING THE RIGHTS OF LISTENERS IN THE GARCETTI
ANALYSIS

Placing university instruction within the ambit of Garcetti fails
to consider the role of the classroom generally, and students
particularly, in professors’ speech. Garcetti stands for the
proposition that the government can regulate the expression of its
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 211, 215–21 (2013) (discussing how positive civic externalities influenced the
Court’s decisions in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education and Tinker v. Des Moines).
96 Cf. Gray, supra note 33, at 1180 (arguing that the government engages in indoctrination
of its students when it does not allow them to decide important issues themselves).
97 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (asserting that “learning-freedom”
is a “corollary” of “academic teaching-freedom” and deserves constitutional protection).
98 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
99 See Worthen, supra note 14, at 1007–08 (“[S]cholarship, unlike teaching, is ‘peculiarly a
marketplace of ideas.’”).
94
95
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employees who speak as their employer.100 But the service provided
by the government in the academic context is the service of
unfiltered speech.101 Controlling the speech of a university
professor—either in their classroom instruction or in their
production of scholarship in the marketplace of ideas—inherently
controls the expression of those who engage in a dialogue with that
speaker. Students are particularly affected by this supervision.102
Impeding a professor’s ability to respond in the manner they think
most appropriate is detrimental to the educational process.
Analyzing their speech as though it were government speech is,
therefore, unreasonable.
Importantly, most reasoning offered by case law that limits
students’ rights of expression only applies to elementary and
secondary students, not the university setting.103 University
students, compared to elementary and secondary school students,
are nearly always the age of majority and are voluntary
participants, not “captive audience[s].”104 They do not require the
100 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (“Proper application of our precedents
thus leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial
discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”).
101 Cf. Habib, supra note 12, at 531 (explaining how valuable instruction arises out of
“thoughtful and inquiring curricula or engaging in probative research”).
102 Norman B. Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers in
the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 397 (1988) (“[C]ontents of student reports and
other assignments, responses to questions, and volunteered comments in class, by their very
nature, cannot be prescribed by higher authority.”).
103 See, e.g., Kai Wahrmann-Harry, Note, The Next Step in Student Speech Analysis? How
the Eighth Circuit Further Complicates the First Amendment Rights of University Students
in Keefe v. Adams, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 449 (2018) (explaining how the holding in
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), relies heavily on schools acting in
loco parentis and that this relationship is ill-suited for determining students’ rights in the
collegiate setting).
104 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Elementary and secondary school students, of course, are subject to truancy laws
and usually do not have the freedom to choose the classes in which they enroll. See Rachel F.
Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation Cases, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 475, 503 (2009) (“Unlike college and university students, pupils are compelled
to attend school until a specified age.”). Conversely, postsecondary enrollment is optional for
every individual, and these students have substantially more freedom to choose their course
of studies. Id.; see also Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should
Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 714 (2010–2011) (discussing the
differences between secondary and postsecondary curricula and teaching methods). Worthen
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same level of oversight or coddling often afforded to students in
lower levels of education.105 While institutions may still have an
interest in their curricula to ensure educational or reputational
standards, any arguments that promote control as a method to
protect students severely diminish the full legal liberty these adult
students should otherwise enjoy. In fact, since 1923, the U.S.
Supreme Court has condemned “‘arbitrary’ restrictions upon the
freedom of teachers to teach and of students to learn.”106 The
symbiotic relationship here is essential: a society that only permits
teachers to teach but does not permit students to learn, or vice
versa, is inherently implementing an arbitrary restriction.
Moreover, recognizing the rights of listeners in cases of
professorial instruction also furthers the purposes of the
university.107 Open discussion is “essential to the credibility of
universities and academic disciplines.”108 Professors are not hired to
parrot the government’s expression back to the public; rather,
professors are hired to forge their own ideas and to promote their
argues that college students are a captive audience, “at least in some scenarios,” by focusing
on the arbitrary definition of college students as adults and the financial incentives and
graduation requirements that students must adhere to. Worthen, supra note 14, at 1002–05.
While Worthen supplies neuroscientific and psychological reasoning for his maturity
argument, id. at 1002, he ignores the legal reality that college students, even as young as
eighteen, enjoy greater legal freedoms (such as the ability to vote) that their younger
counterparts do not possess. See Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti
Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 68 (2008) (“[U]nlike elementary and secondary students,
students at the university level are not a captive audience and, moreover, are legally adults.”).
Worthen also ignores that college students, unlike high school students, have a much greater
ability to choose which classes they take, what subjects to major in, whether to drop out,
whether to switch their course of study, or whether to transfer schools; in short, they can
employ a whole host of other mechanisms through which they can control their course of
study.
105 Cf. Forster, supra note 104, at 714 (“College classes . . . involve a different sort of
teaching than do public school classes. The ability of students to think for themselves
increases with age, whereas younger students are more likely to accept whatever a teacher
says as true.”).
106 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923)). Although Epperson, which upheld an Arkansas statute criminalizing the
instruction of evolution, was decided on establishment clause grounds, the case reiterates the
notion that there is a constitutional guarantee “to acquire useful knowledge.” Id.
107 See Tran, supra note 75, at 978 (arguing that academic freedom promotes expertise
among professors and critical-thinking skills among students).
108 Id.
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students’ ability to do the same.109 Without greater recognition of
academic freedom, students may be deprived of their professor’s
expertise in their subjects, as well as “cutting-edge information.”110
“[T]he academic freedom of teachers and students should create a
zone of protection against encroachment by school authorities in
matters of lectures, class questions, and discussions.”111
Freedom of scholarship follows similar principles. Research
builds on the open dialogue between professional academics;
depriving the community of a single voice is inimical to the “search
for truth.”112 Again, postsecondary institutions employ professors
for unknown contributions they have yet to make, so it is inherent
in their job description that they investigate without administrative
limitation. If an institution does not want to be the mouthpiece for
a professor’s specific research, they have a simple solution: do not
hire that individual in the first place. But by employing a professor,
the institution implicitly authorizes the academic output produced
by that professor.113 Permitting professors to research as they like
without institutional oversight preserves the principle of the
marketplace of ideas and the purposes of the university.

V. CONCLUSION
Garcetti descends from a long line of cases that attempt to
reconcile the government’s interests as an employer with
government employees’ free speech rights.114 Garcetti permits
regulation of speech made by employees on behalf of the government
See Habib, supra note 12, at 542 (denouncing governmental control of professors’
academic activity through unfair school policies as “a type of fraud on the public”); see also
Worthen, supra note 14, at 1012–14 (arguing that universities hire professors to act as private
speakers in their scholarship because outside agencies often fund research projects).
110 Worthen, supra note 14, at 1010.
111 Smith, supra note 102, at 409 (emphasis added).
112 Worthen, supra note 14, at 1009. Worthen also discusses the important role that peers
play in the research process to support academic freedom for speech “among professors.” Id.
113 This would not extend to research that is unethical, libelous, fraudulent, or otherwise
illegal. In these instances, however, either the speech has already been deemed unprotected
by the First Amendment or the Pickering balancing test can correctly determine that the
speech subverted the proper administration of the university. See supra notes 44–50 and
accompanying text.
114 But see Habib, supra note 12, at 522 (arguing that Garcetti “incorrectly relied on”
employee-speech cases to support its holding).
109
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or pursuant to their governmental duties because this is essentially
government speech.115 While applying this doctrine is fairly
straightforward in the vast majority of cases, academic freedom
stands out as a notable exception.
If applied to either scholarship or teaching, Garcetti would
conflict with one of the government’s stated goals and a bedrock
proposition of the First Amendment: supporting the free
marketplace of ideas.116 Garcetti’s potential impact on academic
freedom is particularly egregious because this principle of American
education “is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned.”117 By further analyzing academic speech as
government employee speech, courts ignore the clear constitutional
rights of students and the public at large. Recognizing the rights of
the listeners in the academic context is necessary to support the
“kind of continuing dialogue” inherent in education.118
Furthermore, simply refusing to apply Garcetti to academic
speech does not greatly affect a university’s ability to discipline a
professor when required—absent Garcetti, the Pickering balancing
test still applies.119 Should a professor’s speech involve sexual
harassment or incite riotous behavior in their classroom
instruction, for instance, the public interest in efficient operation
may outweigh the professor’s private interest in expression. Instead
of immediately disregarding all professor speech as unprotected
speech made “pursuant to their official duties,”120 professors will at
least have the opportunity to prove in court why their speech
deserves protection. Requiring the state to demonstrate in open
court how postsecondary instruction or research potentially harms
the public interest would safeguard speech that is merely
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (distinguishing between private
speech and speech within the scope of employment).
116 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.”).
117 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
118 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Tax-Exempt Foundations: Hearings on H. Res. 561 Before the H. Select Comm. to Investigate
Tax-Exempt Founds. & Comparable Orgs., 82d Cong. 291 (1952) (statement of Robert M.
Hutchins, Associate Director of the Ford Foundation)).
119 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
120 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
115
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disagreeable or unfavored. In our society’s quest to ensure the
“vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms . . . in the community
of American schools,”121 it should be more difficult, not easier, for
the government to limit academic freedom.

121

Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
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